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WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-PERMANENT PARTIAL DIS-
ABILITY-EVIDENCE OF ACTUAL WAGES ADMISSIBLE AS A 
FACTOR TO BE CONSIDERED IN DETERMINING CLAIM-
ANT'S LOSS OF EARNING CAPACITY. Hall v. Willard Sand & 
Gravel Co., 60 Md. App. 260, 482 A.2d 159 (1984). 
Following a 1974 award of permanent partial disability benefits for a 
fifty-five percent loss of use of his body,l an employee was injured again 
in the course of his employment in 1975 when he fell from a piece of 
equipment. Subsequent to his initial hospitalization for injuries sustained 
in the fall, the employee was involved in two other accidents unrelated to 
his job, and surgery was delayed for more than a year. 2 Pursuant to the 
employee's claim for benefits occasioned by the fall from the machine, 
the Maryland Workmen's Compensation Commission (Commission) 
found him permanently totally disabled-fifty-five percent due to the 
preexisting disability, thirty percent due to the fall, and fifteen percent 
due to subsequent nonwork-related conditions.3 
The Commission's decision was appealed to the Circuit Court for 
Montgomery County on the issue of the degree of permanent partial dis-
ability apportioned to the injury incurred in the 1975 fall. During the 
trial, the judge disallowed direct testimony about the claimant's average 
1. Hall v. Willard Sand & Gravel Co., 60 Md. App. 260, 263-64, 482 A.2d 159, 161 
(1984). Maryland provided workmen's compensation from 1912-14 for the actual 
decrease in average weekly wages after an accident, and from 1914-47 for the loss of 
capacity to earn. See infra notes 35-41 and accompanying text. The loss of "indus-
trial use" or "industrial loss" terminology, which indicates the degree of permanent 
disability a claimant has suffered, has been used since 1947. Recent cases, in addi-
tion to Hall, have clarified that a determination or finding of industrial loss to an 
employee's body as a whole is a determination of loss of wage earning capacity. Cox 
v. American Store Equip. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 390, 395 (D. Md. 1968); Giant Food, 
Inc. v. Coffey, 52 Md. App. 572, 578,451 A.2d 151, 155 (1982); see 2 A. LARSON, 
THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 58. 13(e) (1983) (industrial loss con-
trasted with physical loss) [hereinafter cited as 'WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION]; see 
also infra notes 42-55 and accompanying text. 
2. Although Hall was scheduled for surgery on his back and for hernia problems ex-
perienced after the 1975 fall, the operation was postponed due to other physical 
ailments. He was in a car accident in December, 1976, and fell down a flight of stairs 
at home in August, 1976. Hall, 60 Md. App. at 262, 264,482 A.2d at 160, 161. 
3. In the appeal to the circuit court, Hall argued that the Maryland Workmen's Com-
pensation Commission (Commission) erred in not finding permanent total disability 
due to either the combination of preexisting disability and the 1975 fall, Appellant's 
Brief at 3, Hall v. Willard Sand & Gravel Co., 60 Md. App. 260, 482 A.2d 159 
(1984), or solely due to the 1975 injury, Reply Brief of Appellant at 6, Hall v. Wil-
lard Sand & Gravel Co., 60 Md. App. 260, 482 A.2d 159 (1984). Because 15% of 
the disability was apportioned to subsequent unrelated problems, Hall could not 
receive permanent total disability benefits. See Subsequent Injury Fund v. Thomas, 
275 Md. 628, 342 A.2d 671 (1975) (subsequent unrelated injuries preclude perma-
nent total disability benefits). Hall sought a finding of permanent total disability 
resulting solely from the 1975 injury in accord with Subsequent Injury Fund v. 
Compton, 28 Md. App. 526, 346 A.2d 475 (1975), affd sub nom. Anchor Motor 
Freight, Inc. v. Subsequent Injury Fund, 278 Md. 320, 363 A.2d 505 (1976), and 
Giant Food, Inc. v. Coffey, 52 Md. App. 572,451 A.2d 151 (1982). In Anchor Motor 
Freight, and Giant Food, permanent total disability was found to result from a par-
ticular injury, notwithstanding preexisting or subsequent injury or illness. 
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weekly wages prior to the injury, but allowed evidence of postinjury earn-
ings on cross-examination,4 and affirmed the Commission's decision.5 
The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland reversed and remanded, hold-
ing that the claimant was entitled to submit evidence to the jury of his 
loss of earning ability, and further held it reversible error to exclude such 
testimony on the basis of possible undue sympathy from the jury.6 
From the formative period of workmen's compensation law, two 
competing theories of compensation that have a direct bearing on the 
Hall decision have emerged.7 These theories are the earning impairment 
theory and the physical impairment theory. The earning impairment the-
ory bases compensation on actual wage loss or loss of earning capacity.8 
Alternatively, the physical impairment theory focuses on loss of bodily 
function in determining the amount of compensation.9 Compensation for 
economic loss thus is contrasted with compensation for medical loss; 10 
the former is based on a calculation or estimate of wage loss while the 
latter is based on a schedule of injuries which categorically relates spe-
cific bodily impairment, loss, or loss of use to a number of weeks for 
which compensation is to be paid. I I 
4. Hall, 60 Md. App. at 264, 482 A.2d at 161. On direct and redirect examination, the 
objection to testimony about prior actual wages was sustained to avoid "undue sym-
pathy" from the jury. [d. This same information about prior earnings, however, was 
admitted into the record at the Commission hearing where the average weekly 
wages at time of injury were determined. Appellant's Brief at 9, Hall v. Willard 
Sand & Gravel Co., 60 Md. App. 260, 482 A.2d 159 (1984). 
5. Hall, 60 Md. App. at 262-63, 482 A.2d at 161. 
6. [d. at 268, 482 A.2d at 163. The court of special appeals held that, because ability to 
work must be considered in determining the degree of disability a claimant has sus-
tained, the employee's wages prior and subsequent to the accident must be among 
the facts available to the jury. [d. 
7. See WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION, supra note 1, § 57.14(a); Recent Cases, Calcula-
tion of Earnings Capacity, 4 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 268 (1978); Burton, Perma-
nent Partial Disabilities and Worker's Compensation, 53 J. URB. L. 853 (1976). 
8. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION, supra note 1, § 57. 14-. 14(a); Recent Cases, supra 
note 7, at 271-74; Burton, supra note 7, at 871-73; see infra notes 42-45 and accom-
panying text. 
9. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION, supra note 1, § 57.14-.14(a). Larson contrasts the 
"earning impairment" and "physical impairment" theories according to "whether 
the essence of what is being compensated for is medical or economic." [d. 
§ 57. 14(a), at 10-28. 
10. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION, supra note 1, § 57. 14(a), at 10-28. The theory based 
on medical loss was formerly known as the "whole-man theory," but is currently 
known as the "physical impairment theory." [d. 
11. [d. § 57. 14-. 14(a). Typically, a schedule relates specific bodily impairment, loss, or 
loss of use to the number of weeks for which compensation will be paid. See id. 
§ 58.00.-. 13(f). Although the payments do not depend on actual wage loss, it is 
presumed conclusively that there will be a loss of earning capacity. [d. § 58.11, at 
10-174; see Larson, The Wage-Loss Principle in Workmen's Compensation, 6 WM. 
MITCHELL L. REV. 501, 507-10 (1980). Larson explains that, although three 
"schools of thought" regarding statutory disability can be identified-actual wage 
loss, earning capacity, and "whole man" or physical impairment-no pure wage-
loss statutes exist today in the United States. The wage-loss statutes provide for both 
economic and medical compensation. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION, supra note 1, 
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Originally, the function of workmen's compensation was to provide 
support for disabled industrial workers during periods when they were 
actually disabled,12 a "purely wage-loss replacement function."13 Before 
developing in the United States, compensation statutes were enacted in 
twenty-one other countries or provinces and none included schedules for 
permanent partial disability apart from actual loss of wages. 14 Of the first 
ten state statutes enacted in the United States, only one had a disability 
schedulel5 and eight were purely wage-loss statutes. 16 
Within a few years, schedules were incorporated into existing state 
compensation laws l7 and newly-adopted state compensation statutes, IS 
including Maryland's. 19 These schedules provided compensation in fixed 
amounts for particular bodily loss,20 but originally were not intended to 
§ 57.14(a); Larson, The Wage-Loss Principle in Workmen's Compensation, 6 WM. 
MITCHELL L. REV. 501 (1980). 
12. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION, supra note 1, § 57.14, at 10-27; see Larson, supra 
note 11, at 502; Oros v. Mayor of Baltimore, 56 Md. App. 685, 690, 468 A.2d 693, 
695 (1983). 
13. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION, supra note 1, § 57. 14(b), at 10-31; Larson, supra note 
11, at 503. 
14. For a list of these countries, provinces, and the dates of enactment, see WORKMEN'S 
COMPENSATION, supra note 1, § 57. 14(b), at 10-32. Larson states that in these sys-
tems the amount of compensation paid was directly related to prior wages, and that 
all twenty-one were "pure wage-loss statutes." Larson, supra note II, at 504-05; 
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION, supra note I, § 57.14(b), at 10-32. 
15. New Jersey had the first compensation statute containing a schedule. WORKMEN'S 
COMPENSATION, supra note 1, § 57. 14(b), at 10-34. For a brief description of a 
schedule, see supra note 11 and infra note 20. Washington had one of the first ten 
workmen's compensation statutes passed in the United States but it was difficult to 
classify. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION, supra note 1, § 57. 14(b) n.61. 
16. In WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION, supra note I, Larson identifies and cites those 
statutes from Wisconsin, Ohio, Kansas, California, Nevada, New Hampshire, Mas-
sachusetts, and Illinois. /d. § 57.14(b), at 10-34; see also Larson, supra note II, at 
506-07. See generally Rhodes, The Inception of Workmen's Compensation in the 
United States, II ME. L. REV. 35 (1917) (detailed account of development of work-
men's compensation statutes). 
17. For a citation and description of these statutes in Ohio, Wisconsin, Nevada, Massa-
chusetts, Illinois, and California, see WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION, supra note I, 
§ 57. 14(d), at 10-39, 10-40 nn.83-88; Larson, supra note 11, at 511 nn.45-50. Cali-
fornia's modified acceptance of a schedule "displayed its kinship to the presumed 
wage-loss principle and its rejection of the physical-impairment principle." WORK-
MEN'S COMPENSATION, supra note I, § 57.14(d), at 10-40 n.88; Larson, supra note 
11, at 511 n.50. 
18. For a citation and description of the original statutes in Michigan and Rhode Is-
land, see WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION, supra note I, § 57.14(d), at 10-39 nn.80-81; 
Larson, supra note 11, at 510 nn.42-43. 
19. Act of April 15, 1912, ch. 837, 1912 Md. Laws 1624, 1626; see WORKMEN'S COM-
PENSATION, supra note I, § 57.14(d), at 10-39, n.82; Larson, supra note II, at 511 
n.44. For background and a description of this statute, see infra notes 34-36 and 
accompanying text. 
20. The two components of the schedule principle include how the amount of compen-
sation is determined and the fixed amount of compensation regardless of wage loss. 
The former is understood in relation to industrial accident schedules in insurance 
policies. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION, supra note I, § 57.14(c); Larson, supra note 
II, at 507-08. 
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be divorced from the wage-loss principle. The injuries included in the 
schedules were serious enough to support a "conclusive presumption that 
actual wage loss would sooner or later result. "21 
Subsequent expansion of the schedule principle22 carried with it this 
presumption of lost earning capacity, even among states applying the 
physical impairment theory.23 In 1974 the Minnesota legislature was the 
first to adopt expressly the physical-impairment basis for permanent par-
tial disability benefits, to the exclusion oflost earning capacity.24 Several 
other state courts have taken similar initiatives when interpreting their 
compensation statutes.25 Notwithstanding this new minority26 of states 
that pay compensation for physical impairment alone, most states make 
compensation awards not merely for physical injury, but also for disabil-
ity that results from such injury.27 These states identified as proponents 
of physical impairment principles arguably still retain the presumption of 
decreased earning capacity,28 and states emphasizing wage-loss theory 
adjust the value of earnings or make limited use of schedules without 
21. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION, supra note 1, § 57. 14(c), at lO-36; Larson, supra note 
11, at 508; see WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION, supra note 1, 58.11. In a 1912 address 
to the Law Association of Philadelphia, denying that the proposed limited schedule 
in an early Pennsylvania statute represented compensation for physical impairment, 
Francis H. Bohlen explained: "the sole object . . . is to protect . . . the injured 
workmen and those dependent upon them from the economic sufferings entailed by 
the total or partial destruction of their earning power." [d. § 57. 14(c), at 10-38; 
Larson, supra note 11, at 510. 
22. See WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION, supra note 1, § 57.l4(d); Larson, supra note 11, 
at 5lO-15. 
23. Larson illustrates by example how case law in New Jersey, Missouri, West Virginia, 
and Wisconsin, states identified with the physical impairment theory, includes a 
rationale for workmen's compensation based on impairment of earning capacity. 
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION, supra note 1, § 57.14(e). 
24. Act of April 12, 1974, ch. 486, 1, 1974 Minn. Laws 1230, 1231 (current version at 
MINN. STAT. § 176.021(3) (1978 & Supp. 1986». The 1974 amendment stated: 
"[p ]ermanent partial disability is payable for functional loss of use or impairment of 
function." Act of April 12, 1974, ch. 486, 1, 1974 Minn. Laws 1230, 1231; see 
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION, supra note 1, §§ 57.14, at lO-27 nn.35-36, 57.14(f), 
at lO-47, 10-48 n.ll; Larson, supra note 11, at 513 nn.55-56. 
25. See, e.g., Cuarisma v. Urban Painters, Ltd., 59 Hawaii 409, 583 P.2d 321 (1978) 
(concept of disability as purely functional and physiological); Cody v. Jayhawk 
Pipeline Corp., 222 Kan. 491, 565 P.2d 264 (1977) (purpose of statute to compen-
sate injured workers for physical injures); Clarius v. Fogleman Truck Lines, Inc., 
367 So.2d 1264 (La. App. 1979) (only loss of use or function required); Redfern v. 
Sparks-Withington CO.,403 Mich. 63, 268 N.W.2d 28 (1978) (effect on wage-earn-
ing capacity not determinitive); Buechler v. North Dakota Workmen's Compensa-
tion Bureau, 222 N.W.2d 858 (N.D. 1974) (permanent total and permanent partial 
award made for the same injury); Taylor v. State Accident Ins. Fund, 40 Or. App. 
437, 595 P.2d 515 (1979) (purpose of permanent partial disability payments to com-
pensate for injury). For a brief account of the facts and reasoning in these cases, see 
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION, supra note 1, § 57.14(f)nn.14-18. 
26. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION, supra note 1, § 57. 14(f), at lO-50. 
27. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION, supra note 1, § 57.11, at 10-2. For an extensive list 
of supporting cases, see id. n.2. 
28. See supra note 23 and accompanying text. 
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losing that classical identity.29 In response to the trend toward con-
verting workmen's compensation into a system paying for physical rather 
than wage-earning impairment,3° and in the interest of economic and ju-
dicial efficiency,3) the Florida legislature passed far-reaching32 amend-
ments to revive emphasis of that state's wage-loss position.33 
After a modest beginning,34 Maryland's first workmen's compensa-
tion statute35 included a limited schedule36 for permanent partial disabil-
29. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION, supra note 1, § 57. 14(a), at 10-30. Larson identifies 
these concessions as (1) adjustments of earnings before and after the injury to make 
comparison more realistic and (2) limited use of schedules. /d. Examples of vari-
ables used to determine earnings adjustments are: change in general wage levels; 
age, training, or hours; wages paid out of sympathy or in consideration of long 
service; and lack of performance of employment following injury. Id. § 57.32-.35. 
30. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION, supra note 1, § 57.15, at 10-62; Larson, supra note 
11, at 510-22. 
31. Larson identifies two motives behind the "present movement to restore the wage 
loss principle": (1) reducing monetary "waste" compensating losses that are not 
disabling; and (2) reducing administrative, legal, and judicial waste of time and re-
sources. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION, supra note 1, § 57. 14(j); Larson, supra note 
11, at 522. 
32. Whittaker, The 1979 Florida Workers' Compensation Law (The Wage-Loss Con-
cept), 49 INS. COUNS. J. 76 (1982). 
33. Act of May 11, 1979, ch. 79-40,1979 Fla. Sess. Law Servo 311 (West) (amending 
FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 20, 440, 624, 627 (West 1966 & Supp. 1978). Oregon has con-
sidered a reform of compensation laws that would make rehabilitation and reem-
ployment of the injured worker the primary goal, and in 1980, Delaware considered 
wage-loss reform. See WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION, supra note 1, § 57.15; Larson, 
supra note 11, at 523-31. 
34. Larson, The Nature and Origins of Workmen s Compensation, 37 CORNELL L.Q. 
206,232 (1952). Maryland enacted the first compensation act in the United States in 
1902. Act of April 1, 1902, ch. 139, 1902 Md. Laws 218 (a cooperative insurance 
fund for miners). This statute was held unconstitutional in an unappealed decision 
in the Court of Common Pleas of Baltimore City. Franklin V. United Rys. & Elec. 
Co. of Baltimore, 2 Baltimore City Rep. 309 (1904); Rhodes, The Inception of 
Workmen's Compensation in the United States, 11 ME. L. REV. 35, 43-44 (1917); 
Student Project, Developments in Workers Compensation Law, 53 J. URB. L. 755, 
757 (1976). 
35. Act of April 15, 1912, ch. 837, 1912 Md. Laws 1624. This Act was to "facilitate the 
insurance of employees against the consequence of accidents resulting in personal 
injury or death, and to permit agreements between employers and employees with 
reference to such accidents." Id. The insurance was to be administered under the 
supervision of the State Insurance Commissioner. Id.; see WORKMEN'S COMPENSA-
TION, supra note 1, § 57. 14(d) n.82; Larson, supra note II, at 511 n.44; supra note 
19 and accompanying text. Before public general laws were passed, the Maryland 
legislature recognized special conditions in the coal and clay mines of Allegany and 
Garrett Counties. After an initial statute that compensated for negligent fatalities, 
Act of April 8, 1902, ch. 412, 1902 Md. Laws 593 (repealed April 7, 1910), the 
legislature enacted a public local law "to create a fund for the relief and sustenance" 
of injured employees. This statute included a schedule for loss of hands, feet, and 
eyesight, and the support it offered for "those who are or may become paupers and 
charges upon the public" reflected the strong presumption of wage loss. Act of April 
7, 1910, ch. 153, 1910 Md. Laws 484, 484-89. For a description of this act and the 
context in which it originated, see Solvuca V. Ryan & Reilly Co., 131 Md. 265,280, 
101 A. 710, 715 (1917). 
36. The schedule covered amputation of one or both hands or feet and the irrevocable 
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ity, which provided compensation for amputation of one or both hands 
or feet and loss of one or both eyes. Payments were based on average 
weekly wages during the year prior to injury, less the average amount 
earned after the accident. This statute acknowledged functional loss but 
paid compensation only during periods of disability37-a solid wage-loss 
position. A lengthy statute was enacted in 1914,38 enlarging the schedule 
and inserting a category of permanent partial disability not on the sched-
ule, labeled "other cases."39 Compensation for this category of disability 
again was related to wages before and after the injury.40 Compensation, 
however, was not for mere wage loss, but for "loss of wage-earning 
capacity."41 
loss of one or both eyes. Act of April 15, 1912, ch. 837, § 5(111), 1912 Md. Laws 
1624, 1627. 
37.Id. 
38. Act of April 16, 1914, ch. 800, 1914 Md. Laws 1429 (creating the State Industrial 
Accident Commission and the State Accident Fund). This act was declared consti-
tutional in Solvuca v. Ryan & Reilly Co., 131 Md. 265, 101 A. 710 (1917). The 
purpose of this act was to "protect capital and labor, employer and employee, and 
the State, against waste and distress incident to modern industry," Liggett & Mey-
ers Tobacco Co. v. Goslin, 163 Md. 74, 80, 160 A. 804, 807 (1932), and to "provide 
a speedy and inexpensive method by which compensation might be made to [em-
ployees] or those dependent upon them without the delay of long and tedious litiga-
tion," Brenner v. Brenner, 127 Md. 189, 193,96 A. 287, 288 (1915). This purpose 
was further explained in Queen v. Agger, 287 Md. 342, 343, 412 A.2d 733, 733-34 
(1980) (to "provide workers with compensation for loss of earning capacity"); 
Edgewood Nursing Home v. Maxwell, 282 Md. 422, 426, 384 A.2d 748, 751 (1978) 
(to "protect workers and their families from the hardships inflicted by work-related 
injuries"); Bethlehem-Sparrows Point Shipyard, Inc. v. Damasiewicz, 187 Md. 474, 
480, 50 A.2d 799, 802 (1947) (to "provide compensation for loss of earning 
capacity"). 
39. This portion of the statute stated: 
Other Cases. In all other cases in this class of disability the compensation 
shall be fifty per centum of the difference between his average weekly 
wages and his wage-earning capacity thereafter in the same employment 
or otherwise, if less than before the accident (but not to exceed twelve 
dollars per week), payable during the continuance of such partial disabil-
ity, but not to exceed $3,000.00, and subject to reconsideration of the de-
gree of such impairment by the Commission on its own motion or upon 
application of any party in interest. 
Act of April 16, 1914, ch. 800, § 35(3), 1914 Md. Laws 1429, 1453. This provision 
was declared constitutional in Allen v. Glenn L. Martin Co., 188 Md. 290, 52 A.2d 
605 (1947). For a history of this section with examples of its application, see M. 
PRESSMAN, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION IN MARYLAND § 3-4(2) (2d ed. 1977). 
40. "Average weekly wages" were defined in another section of this statute as those 
earned by a full-time employee. Act of April 16, 1914, ch. 800, § 62(8), 1914 Md. 
Laws 1429, 1463; see Stevenson v. Hill, 171 Md. 572,189 A. 910 (1937); Campbell 
Coal Co. v. Stuby, 159 Md. 280, 150 A. 878 (1930); Merrill v. State Military Dept., 
152 Md. 474, 136 A. 897 (1927); Picanardi v. Emerson Hotel Co., 135 Md. 92, 108 
A. 483 (1919); WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION, supra note 1, § 60. 11 (a). 
41. Miller v. McGraw Co., 184 Md. 529,540,42 A.2d 237, 243 (1945); Baltimore Tube 
Co. v. Dove, 164 Md. 87, 98-99, 164 A. 161, 165 (1933); Baltimore Publishing Co. 
v. Hendricks, 156 Md. 74, 79, 143 A. 654, 655 (1928); Jirout v. Gebelein, 142 Md. 
692, 697, 121 A. 831, 833 (1923); see Townsend v. Bethlehem-Fairfield Shipyard, 
Inc., 186 Md. 406, 47 A.2d 365 (1946); Oros v. Mayor of Baltimore, 56 Md. App. 
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In 1947, the definition of nonscheduled permanent partial disability 
was amended to provide for impairment of "industrial use of the em-
ployee's body" as a result of the injury.42 To determine industrial loss, 
685, 690-91, 468 A.2d 693, 695-96 (1983); see also Benoni v. Bethlehem-Fairfield 
Shipyard, Inc., 188 Md. 306, 52 A.2d 613 (permanent partial disability award less 
than maximum available), appeal dismissed, 332 U.S. 749 (1947); Hyman v. Tyler, 
188 Md. 301, 52 A.2d 610 (same), appeal dismissed, 332 U.S. 749 (1947); Gorman v. 
Atlantic Gulf & Pac. Co., 178 Md. 71, 12 A.2d 525 (1940) (compensation included 
awards for temporary total and permanent partial disability); Bethlehem Steel Co. v. 
Mayo, 168 Md. 410, 177 A. 910 (1935) (permanent partial disability award to un-
employed laborer for loss of use ofleg); Coca-Cola Bottling Works v. Lilly, 154 Md. 
239, 140 A. 215 (1928) (employee's return to work prevented by physicalloss). Dur-
ing this period, the right in Maryland to workmen's compensation lost its depen-
dence on lost wages, but the relation to wage loss did not disappear. See, e.g., 
Bethlehem-Sparrows Point Shipyard, Inc. v. Glass, 188 Md. 501, 507-08, 53 A.2d 
405, 409 (1947) (impairment in terms of potential loss of earnings may be found, 
although no loss of earnings occurred); Allen v. Glenn L. Martin Co., 188 Md. 290, 
300, 52 A.2d 605, 610 (1947) (same); Griffin v. Rustless Iron & Steel Co., 187 Md. 
524, 531, 51 A.2d 280, 283 (1947) (right to file a claim does not depend on lost 
wages, but loss of function may be a deterrent from or denial of future promotion or 
employment); Baltimore Tube Co. v. Dove, 164 Md. 87,98, 164 A. 161, 165 (1933) 
(loss of earning capacity, not loss of wages); Baltimore Publishing Co. v. Hendricks, 
156 Md. 74, 79, 143 A. 654, 655 (1928) (same). Although the relation of compensa-
tion to wage loss became more indirect, there was still a direct correspondence be-
tween compensation and actual earnings, which were used to determine the risk of 
lost wages or earning capacity for insurance purposes. Stevenson v. Hill, 171 Md. 
572,576-77, 189 A. 910, 912-13 (1937). 
The system has as its foundation a correspondence between compensation 
to be paid and the amounts paid the active workmen according to the pay 
rolls. The actual earnings are to furnish the basis of calculating the fund to 
cover the compensation .... The actual earnings are taken as determining 
the risk of loss of earnings or capacity. 
Id.; see also Picanardi v. Emerson Hotel Co., 135 Md. 92, 108 A. 483 (1919) (calcu-
lation of compensation award may include monetary value of fringe benefits pro-
vided by employer if such value was fixed by the parties at the time of hiring); 
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION, supra note 1, § 57.21. 
42. Act of May 7, 1947, ch. 895, § 35(4), 1947 Md. Laws 2126, 2129 (codified as 
amended at MD. ANN. CODE art. 101, § 36(4)(a) (1985)); see M. PRESSMAN, 
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION IN MARYLAND § 3-4(2) (2d ed. 1977); see supra note 
1. After the statutory test shifted from loss of earning capacity to loss of industrial 
use, the Court of Appeals of Maryland said in dicta that a claimant "need not show 
loss of wages or earning capacity in order to be entitled to compensation for an 
accidental injury." Belschner v. Anchor Post Products, Inc., 227 Md. 89, 92, 175 
A.2d 419,421 (1961) (emphasis added); see Baltimore Publishing Co. v. Hendricks, 
156 Md. 74, 143 A. 654 (1928); Baltimore Tube Co. v. Dove, 164 Md. 87, 164 A. 
161 (1933). The court of special appeals took the reverse position in Hall, acknowl-
edging that industrial loss is essentially a "loss of wage-earner capacity." 60 Md. 
App. 260, 267,482 A.2d 159, 163 (1984); see Cox v. American Store Equip. Corp., 
283 F. Supp. 390 (D. Md. 1968); infra notes 52-55 and accompanying text; see also 
Queen v. Agger, 287 Md. 342, 343,412 A.2d 733, 734 (1980) (one purpose of statute 
is to provide compensation for loss of earning capacity); Giant Food, Inc. v. Coffey, 
52 Md. App. 572, 578, 451 A.2d 151, 155 (1982) (finding industrial loss is 
equivalent to finding loss of earning capacity). 
In Cox, the United States District Court for the District of Maryland explained 
the difficulties in implementing this provision in the 1914 and 1947 laws. Pursuant 
to the 1914 statute, the Commission made a discretionary award based on the differ-
ence between average weekly wages and wage-earning capacity after the accident. A 
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the Commission considered, "among other things, the nature of the 
physical injury, the occupation, experience, training and age of the in-
jured employee at the time of the injury."43 Based on the assessment of 
loss, compensation paid was related explicitly to the worker's established 
weekly wages at the time of injury, and in certain instances was as much 
as full wages.44 The claimant's injury in Hall v. Willard Sand & Gravel 
Co. came under the current version of this nonscheduled permanent par-
tial disability provision. 
In 1975, although the method of determining industrial loss re-
claimant's right of appeal was limited, however, to the factual determination of 
wage-earning capacity. The 1947 amendments preserved this right of appeal by giv-
ing the award a "direct relationship to the determination of industrial loss or earn-
ing capacity." Cox, 283 F. Supp. at 395; see M. PRESSMAN, WORKMEN'S 
COMPENSATION IN MARYLAND § 3-4(2) (2d ed. 1977); Boughman Contracting Co. 
v. Mellott, 216 Md. 278, 285, 139 A.2d 852, 855 (1958); Townsend v. Bethlehem-
Fairfield Shipyard, Inc., 186 Md. 406, 421-22, 47 A.2d 365,371-72 (1946); Miller v. 
James McGraw Co., 184 Md. 529, 539-40, 42 A.2d 237, 242-43 (1945); Baltimore 
Tube Co. v. Dove, 164 Md. 87, 99-100, 164 A. 161, 165-66 (1933); Cf Bonner v. 
Celanese Corp. of Am., 195 Md. 9, 13, 72 A.2d 686, 688 (1949) (review to show 
award bore reasonable relation to injury suffered); Allen v. Glenn L. Martin Co., 
188 Md. 290, 300, 52 A.2d 605, 609 (1947) (same). 
43. Act of May 7, 1947, ch. 895, § 35(4), 1947 Md. Laws 2126,2129-30. It was this 
clause in the current statute, MD. ANN. CODE art. 101, § 36(4)(a) (1985), to which 
the claimant in Hall looked for support. Hall, 60 Md. App. at 265-66, 482 A.2d at 
161-62. See infra notes 59-60 and accompanying text. 
44. The text of the subsection states: 
Other Cases. In all other cases of disability, other than those specifically 
enumerated disabilities set forth in Sub-section (3) of Section 35, which 
disability is partial in character, but permanent in quality, the Commission 
shall determine the portion or percentage by which the industrial use of 
the employee's body was impaired as a result of the injury, and in deter-
mining such portion or percentage of impairment resulting in an industrial 
loss the Commission shall take into consideration, among other things, the 
nature of the physical injury, the occupation, experience, training and age 
of the injured employee at the time of injury, and shall award compensa-
tion in such proportion as the allowable for permanent total disability de-
termined loss bears to compensation, the said compensation to be paid 
weekly at the rate of sixty-six and two-thirds per centum of the average 
weekly wages, in no case to exceed twenty dollars per week, and not less 
than a minimum of ten dollars per week unless the employee's established 
weekly wages are less than ten dollars per week at the time of the injury, in 
which event he shall receive compensation equal to his full wages, but not 
to exceed $5,000.00, and subject to reconsideration of the degree of such 
impairment by the Commission on its own motion or upon application of 
any party in interest. 
Act of May 7, 1947, ch. 895, § 35(4), 1947 Md. Laws 2126, 2129-30 (codified as 
amended at MD. ANN. CODE art. 101, § 36(4)(a) (1985». The definition of average 
weekly wages was amended in 1947 to state: 
[A]nd if any employee shall receive wages paid in part by his employer and 
part by the United States under any veterans' benefit law enacted by Con-
gress, the term "Average weekly wages" shall mean the total average 
weekly wages from both sources earned by such an employee when work-
ing on full-time. 
Act of April 2, 1947, ch. 283, § 80(8), 1947 Md. Laws 452 (codified as amended at 
MD. ANN. CODE art. 101, § 67(8) (1985». 
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mained the same, the base, minimum, and maximum numerical figures 
changed.45 The state average weekly wage, as determined by the Mary-
land Department of Employment Security, was introduced as a factor 
limiting maximum compensation awarded and a claimant's actual wages 
were used to set the minimum level in a particular case.46 Today, except 
for changes in base figures,47 this subsection of Maryland's workmen's 
compensation law remains the same.48 
In holding that the claimant was entitled to present direct evidence 
to the jury of his loss of wage earning ability, the court in Hall referred to 
the purpose of workmen's compensation as expressed by the court of ap-
peals prior to the 1947 amendments - to compensate workers for lost 
earning capacity resulting from job-related injuries.49 In addition, the 
court relied on Cox v. American Store Equipment Corp.,50 where the 
United States District Court for the District of Maryland interpreted 
Maryland's nonscheduled permanent partial disability provision.51 Ac-
cording to the Cox decision, Maryland law required the Commission to 
determine the effect of an injury on an employee's subsequent ability to 
45. Act of May 15, 1975, ch. 639, 1975 Md. Laws 2962,2964 (codified as amended at 
MD. ANN. CODE art. 101, § 36(4)(a) (1985)). By this time, the provision for the 
average weekly wages a full-time employee earned had been amended to include 
"tips and the reasonable value of board, rent, housing, lodging, or similar advan-
tages received from an employer." Act of April 22, 1949, ch. 257, § 67(8), 1949 Md. 
Laws 656 (codified as amended at MD. ANN. CODE art. 101, § 67(8) (1985)); see M. 
PRESSMAN, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION IN MARYLAND § 3-12(2) (2d ed. 1977). 
46. Act of May 15, 1975, ch. 639, § 36(4)(a), 1975 Md. Laws 2962, 2964 (codified as 
amended at MD. ANN. CODE art. 101, § 36(4)(a) (1985)). The statute relates com-
pensation to wages "established" by the employee: "[I]n no case shall the employee 
receive less than a minimum of fifty dollars per week unless the employee's estab-
lished weekly wages are less than fifty dollars per week at the time of injury in which 
event he shall receive compensation equal to his weekly wages." [d. 
47. Act of May 17, 1976, ch. 652, § 36(4)(a), 1976 Md. Laws 1809, 1810 (percentage 
loss of industrial use related to a number of weeks instead of dollar amount); Act of 
April 2, 1982, ch. 17, § 36(4)(a), 1982 Md. Laws 72, 104 (no change) (codified as 
amended at MD. ANN. CODE art. 101, § 36(4)(a) (1985)). 
48. MD. ANN. CODE art. 101, § 36(4)(a) (1985); see M. PRESSMAN, WORKMEN'S COM-
PENSATION IN MARYLAND § 3-4(2) (2d ed. 1977). For a history of § 36(4)(a) from 
1914-46, see Townsend v. Bethlehem-Fairfield Shipyard, Inc., 186 Md. 406, 47 A.2d 
365 (1946). 
49. Hall v. Willard Sand & Gravel Co., 60 Md. App. 260, 265, 482 A.2d 159, 162 
(1984). Before Maryland's legislature approved the 1947 amendments, adopting the 
"industrial loss" language, the purpose of the Workmen's Compensation Act ex-
pressed by the Court of Appeals of Maryland was to "provide compensation for loss 
of earning capacity resulting from accidental injuries sustained in industrial employ-
ment." Bethlehem-Sparrows Point Shipyard, Inc. v. Damasiewicz, 187 Md. 474, 
480, 50 A.2d 799, 802 (1947). More recently, the court recognized that workmen's 
compensation is "one facet of an overall system of wage-loss protection, and that the 
underlying principle of the system is to restore to the worker a portion of wages lost 
by physical disability, unemployment, or old age." Mazor v. Department ofCorrec-
tion, 279 Md. 355, 363, 369 A.2d 82, 88 (1977). 
50. 283 F. Supp. 390 (D. Md. 1968). 
51. MD. ANN. CODE art. 101, § 36(4)(a) (1985). 
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work and earn a wage. 52 The federal court found this assessment of in-
dustrial loss "in essence a determination of loss in wage-earning capac-
ity."53 This was the same position suggested by the court of appeals in 
Queen v. Agger,54 and reached by the court of special appeals in Oros v. 
Mayor of Baltimore 55 and Giant Food, Inc. v. Coffey.56 
The Hall court adopted Professor Larson's statement of the law 
describing preinjury and postinjury earnings as evidence of the degree of 
earning capacity impairment. 57 After affirming the relevance in Mary-
land of wage-earning ability to the disability concept,58 the court con-
cluded that a jury should be allowed to consider the difference between a 
52. Cox v. American Store Equip. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 390, 394 (D. Md. 1968). The 
court compared industrial loss under Maryland's statute with loss of "wage earning 
capacity" in § 908(c)(21) of the District of Columbia Compensation Act, Long-
shoremen's & Harbor Worker's Compensation Act, 33 U.S.c. § 908(c)(21) (1982). 
Under the Longshoremen's Act, wage-earning capacity is determined on the basis of 
actual earnings or from factors or circumstances affecting the capacity to earn, such 
as the nature of the injury, degree of physical loss, usual employment, and future 
effect of disability. Id. § 908(h). The factors considered under the Maryland statute 
to determine industrial loss include, "among other things, the nature of the physical 
injury, the occupation, experience, training and age of the injured employee at the 
time of injury." MD. ANN. CODE art. 101, § 36(4)(a) (1985). The court found that 
these factors presented "no material difference in the determination of 'industrial 
loss' under the Maryland statute and 'loss of wage-earning capacity' under the Fed-
eral act." Cox, 283 F. Supp. at 395. 
53.Id. 
54. 287 Md. 342, 343, 412 A.2d 733, 734 (1980); see Bethlehem-Sparrows Point Ship-
yard, Inc. v. Damasiewicz, 187 Md. 474,480, 50 A.2d 799, 802 (1947). 
55. 56 Md. App. 685, 691, 468 A.2d 693, 696 (1983). 
56. 52 Md. App. 572, 578,451 A.2d 151, 155 (1982). 
57. Hall v. Willard Sand & Gravel Co., 60 Md. App. 260,266-67,482 A.2d 159, 162-63 
(1984). Larson states: 
Apart from schedule and disfigurement allowances, "compensation is 
awarded not for the injury as such but rather for an impairment of earning 
capacity caused by the injury." However, as stressed above, post-injury 
earnings and earning capacity are not synonymous. Earnings equal to 
preinjury earnings are the strongest evidence of nonimpairment of capac-
ity, but they are not conclusive. 
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION, supra note 1, § 57.31; see Zeigale's Case, 325 Mass. 
128, 129-30, 89 N.E.2d 264, 265 (1949) (dimunition of earning capacity must be 
shown); Eckman v. Ex-Cell-O Corp., 58 Mich. App. 94, 96,226 N.W.2d 855, 856 
(Mich. App. 1975) (it is essential to show causal connection between physical loss 
and inability to obtain employment); Hill v. J. P. Stevens & Co., 360 So.2d 1035, 
1036 (Ala. Civ. App. 1978) (both bodily disability and loss of ability to earn must be 
determined). 
58. Hall v. Willard Sand & Gravel Co., 60 Md. App. 260, 266-67, 482 A.2d 159, 163 
(1984). The court deferred to Larson's guidance in the determination of disability: 
The key to the understanding of this problem is the recognition, at the 
outset, that the disability concept is a blend of two ingredients, whose re-
currence in different proportions gives rise to most controversial disability 
questions: The first ingredient is disability in the medical or physical sense, 
as evidenced by obvious loss of members or by medical testimony that the 
claimant simply cannot make the necessary muscular movements and ex-
ertions; the second ingredient is de facto inability to earn wages, as evi-
denced by proof that the claimant has not in fact earned anything. 
Id.; WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION, supra note I, § 57.11, at 10-6, 10-7. 
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claimant's wages at the time of injury and subsequent to the injury. 59 
Moreover, this evidence of actual wages was held to be included in the 
"among other things" clause of Maryland's compensation statute60 as 
one relevant factor to be applied in determining overall loss of earning 
capacity.61 Thus, the circuit court's exclusion of this material and proba-
tive evidence62 was impermissible, and the exclusion was reversible error 
in light of the "extremely difficult task" of apportioning the claimant's 
disability in relation to his ability to work.63 
According to Hall, this principle of comparing actual wages at the 
time of an injury with postinjury wages has been applied explicitly in 
most jurisdictions and "implicitly recognized in Maryland."64 The 
court's acknowledgment in this case amounts to a forceful expression of 
Maryland's consistent refusal to award compensation for nonscheduled 
permanent partial disabilities on the basis of physical loss divorced from 
wage-earning ability. Maryland's original wage-loss position65 has been 
59. "[A]n employee's ability to work necessarily requires that the trier of facts be per-
mitted to consider among other facts the amount of wages the claimant earned both 
before and after the accident." Hall v. Willard Sand & Gravel Co., 60 Md. App. 
260, 268, 482 A.2d 159, 163 (1984). 
60. [d. at 265, 482 A.2d at 162; MD. ANN. CODE art. 101, § 36(4)(a) (1985); see supra 
note 43 and accompanying text. 
61. Hall v. Willard Sand & Gravel Co., 60 Md. App. 260, 266, 482 A.2d 159, 162 
(1984). In Oros v. Mayor of Baltimore, 56 Md. App. 685, 468 A.2d 693' (1983), it 
was stated that "to the extent that age is consideration, wage loss is arguably con-
templated by the ["among other things"] formula, at least in the calculation of the 
percentage of the future wages lost." [d. at 691, 468 A.2d at 696. In Cox v. Ameri-
can Store Equip. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 390 (D. Md. 1968), the court concluded that 
consideration of the factors requires a "determination of the effect an injury will 
have on the employee's ability to work and earn a wage after sustaining an injury." 
[d. at 394. The court explained that because nonscheduled injuries do not carry the 
presumption of lost earning capacity, a "factual determination must be made." [d. 
In Hall, without the comparison of actual wages, the jury determined the degree of 
disability "almost exclusively on the showing of anatomical loss ... too narrow a 
basis for the determination of industrial loss." 60 Md. App. 260, 266, 482 A.2d 159, 
162 (1984). 
62. Hall v. Willard Sand & Gravel Co., 60 Md. App. 260, 267-68,482 A.2d 159, 163 
(1984). 
63. [d. 
64. [d. at 264-65, 482 A.2d at 162. Although no supporting Maryland citations were 
given, reference was made to Larson's display of the weight of authority in WORK-
MEN'S COMPENSATION, supra note 1, §§ 57.11 n.2, 57.31 n.91. Larson explains that 
when evidence reveals earnings prior to and after the accident are equal such evi-
dence creates a "presumption which may be overcome by other evidence showing 
the actual earnings do not fairly reflect claimant's capacity." [d. § 57.31, 10-122, 10-
123. This was the type of reasoning the claimant presented to the court of special 
appeals in Hall. Instead of disallowing such testimony on the basis of possible undue 
sympathy from the jury, the court should recognize procedural safeguards, such as 
cross examination, jury instructions, and independent evidence, to safeguard against 
the prejudicial effect of such testimony. See Appellant's Brief at 12-13, Hall v. Wil-
lard Sand & Gravel Co., 60 Md. App. 260, 482 A.2d 159 (1984). 
65. See supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text. 
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modified by expanded schedule benefits,66 but the basis for the sceduled 
and nonscheduled compensation awards has never been limited to physi-
cal injury.67 From actual wage loss (1912),68 to "loss of earning capacity" 
(1914),69 to "industrial loss" (1947),70 Maryland has maintained an eco-
nomic theory as well as a medical theory of compensation.71 Moreover, 
four out of the five express factors to be included in evaluating nonsched-
uled permanent partial disability-occupation, experience, training, and 
age-are tied intimately to the wage level of a particular worker in par-
ticular employment settings. 72 Although state averages for weekly wages 
have been included in the formula for evaluating disability since 1975, 
the averages are applied in direct relation to the worker's actual wages.73 
The overwhelming impact of the relevance of actual wage informa-
tion in determining earning capacity is evidenced by the total absence of 
contrary argument before the court of special appeals. In its failure to 
persuade the court that the claimant's testimony was immaterial,74 the 
employer conceded to the weight of authority among other jurisdic-
tions75 as well as Maryland's own long standing application of the wage-
loss concept. Even though evidence of actual wages is only one among a 
number of factors relevant to the determination of wage-earning capac-
66. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 101, § 36(3) (1985); M. PRESSMAN, WORKMEN'S COM-
PENSATION IN MARYLAND § 3-4(1) (2d ed. 1977 & Supp. 1980). 
67. Contra Cody v. Jayhawk Pipeline Corp., 222 Kan. 491, 493, 565 P.2d 264, 267 
(1977) (the court stated that the "primary purpose of ... workmen's compensation 
... is to compensate an injured workman for his physical injuries."); see WORK-
MEN'S COMPENSATION, supra note 1, § 57.14(f) n.15. In contrast, workmen's com-
pensation in Maryland has been viewed as: 
one facet of an overall system of wage-loss protection ... the underlying 
principle of the system is to restore to the worker a portion of wages lost 
by physical disability, unemployment and old age. It follows that although 
two or more causes of wage loss may coincide, the benefits need not cumu-
late, for the worker experiences but one wage loss. 
Mazor v. Department of Correction, 279 Md. 355, 363, 369 A.2d 82, 88 (1977); see 
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION, supra note 1, ch. XVIII. 
68. See supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text. 
69. See supra notes 38-41 and accompanying text. 
70. See supra notes 42-44 and accompanying text. 
71. See WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION, supra note 1, § 57.11 (discussing the integration 
of medical disability and earning impairment components). 
72. For a discussion of the impact of age, training, and hours on earning capacity, see 
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION, supra note 1, § 57.33; Larson, supra note 10, at 524 
n.94. For an argument relating age to loss of earning capacity and wage loss, see 
Oros v. Mayor of Baltimore, 56 Md. App. 685, 691, 468 A.2d 693, 696 (1983). 
73. See supra note 46 and accompanying text. 
74. The employer argued that the circuit court judge did not err by excluding the evi-
dence of prior wages because the information was included in the employee's origi-
nal claim filed with the Commission, and the claim was admitted into evidence as an 
exhibit. Even if it was error, the employer went on to argue, it was harmless because 
the jury didn't need that information to reach its finding. Appellee's Brief at 6-14, 
Hall v. Willard Sand & Gravel Co., 60 Md. App. 260, 482 A.2d 159 (1984). For the 
claimant's reply that the error was prejudicial, see Reply Brief of Appellant at 2-8, 
Hall v. Willard Sand & Gravel Co., 60 Md. App. 260, 482 A.2d 159 (1984). 
75. See supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text. 
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ity, Maryland's consistent association of workmen's compensation with a 
claimant's economic reality forbids exclusion of such pertinent informa-
tion from the trier of fact when it is apportioning disability. Indeed, had 
the trial judge overruled the objection in the first instance, this wage-loss 
principle may have been implemented without further notice or appeal. 
As a result of Hall, however, Maryland's position in the present move-
ment to restore the centrality of earning impairment principles76 rests no 
longer on implication, but on overt judicial action. 
Ralph E. Wilson, III 
76. See WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION, supra note 1, § 57. 14(j), at 10-60; Larson, supra 
note 11, at 522-23. 
